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Joseph H.H. Weiler

Alternatives to Withdrawal from
an International Organization:

THE CASE OF THE EE
Abbreviated adaptation of a study prepared for the Nathan
Feinberg Festschrift (20 Israel Law Review 282 (1986))
International lawyers are accustomed to a measure of
skepticism regarding their discipline. The absence in
the international legal order of a centralized legislator, compulsory adjudicator and, in particular, a law
enforcement agency all lead to a measure of disbelief
in the reality of international law.
One of the classical debates on this theme concerns
the right of States, as members of an international
organization, to withdraw unilaterally from the organization, thereby eschewing their obligations to their
fellow members.
The problem arises because of a common practice of
omitting withdrawal clauses from the constituent treaties of many international organizations-as if not
wishing to mar the marriage with talk about divorce.
The prevailing view is that there exists no presumption in favor of the right of unilateral withdrawal, and
that withdrawal is therefore permitted only if it is
expressly provided for or can be inferred by implication from the constitutent document of the organization. For example, in several cases States which
withdrew unilaterally were held liable for continued
membership fees.
Despite the merits of this conclusion, it poses two
extra-legal problems. In the first place, one may simply
ask: "So what?" Will a State determined to withdraw
from an international organization really be impressed
by the feeble international legal prohibition? Second,
and more important, the practice of withdrawal has
diminished considerably. Much more common, and
troubling, is the practice of States to remain members
of the organization while evading their obligations in
one way or another.

In dealing with this issue, instead of discussing
international organizations in general, I shall concentrate exclusively on the European Economic Community (EEC). An entity defying a precise conceptual
categorization, the EEC, in its internal structure and
process, straddles the line between an international
organization and a quasi-federation. Thus, the issues
encapsuled in the problem of unilateral withdrawal
offer different, more complex, and highly interesting
perspectives of transnational practice and doctrine.
Withdrawal from an international organization,
whether unilateral or negotiated, is a drastic step. It is
not taken lightly, and it indicates that a State has been
unable to express its voice adequately in the organization. In many cases, especially for smaller States,
withdrawal carries many penalties. Generally, the
withdrawing State will not only lose whatever direct
benefits accrue from membership, but will also lose a
forum from which to influence the behavior of others.
It is not surprising therefore, that withdrawal, unilateral or negotiated, is relatively rare and adopted as
a '1ast straw" measure.
The drastic nature of withdrawal, especially unilateral withdrawal, leads instead for a search by what
we may now call "recalcitrant Member States" for other
techniques to avoid unpalatable consequences of membership. Naturally, recalcitrance occurs once a Member
State has failed to convince its partners by the normal
decisional processes of the organization.
In the EEC it is possible to identify, in addition to the
threat of withdrawal, three other such techniques:
-inactive membership, whereby a Member State
retains formal membership but withdraws from any
active participation in the life of the organization;
-overactive membership, whereby a Member State
retains full membership but seeks to use this mem-
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bership to obstruct (illicitly) the internal processes in
such a way as to avoid the consequences of unpalatable policies;
-selective membership, whereby a Member State
retains membership but seeks to avoid the fulfillment of the unpalatable obligations by simply disregarding them.

non-superfluous meaning, it must be that it is a nonwithdrawal clause.
The Court of Justice of the European Community,
which is the supreme judicial body charged with interpreting the Treaty of Rome, has not had occasion to
give a direct response to this question. Its dicta in
Commission v. France are, however, highly suggestive:

I shall analyze in turn each of the four techniques
with particular regard to the legal constraints on such
behavior.

The Member States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, having permanent
institutions vested with real powers, stemming
from a limitation of authority or a transfer of
powers from the States to that Community.

1. Unilateral Withdrawal
Unlike the Treaty of Paris, which established the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for a
limited duration of 50 years, the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC, was in the language of Article 240
"concluded for an unlimited period."
Given the language of Article 240, must we deduce
that, absent any contrary indication to be derived from
the interpretation of the treaty, unilateral withdrawal
would be prohibited? I shall first treat this formal legal
question and then offer some political observations. In
principle, the relevance of the formal legal analysis of
the right to unilateral withdrawal from the EEC is very
limited.
How then should one interpret the delphic Article
240? It should be remembered that the travaux of the
Treaty of Rome have not been published and cannot
therefore be used as an aid in interpretation. To be

Withdrawal, unilateral
or negotiated, is relatively rare and adopted
as a "last straw"
measure.
sure, the failed European Political Community, on the
ashes of which the EEC Treaty was drafted, contained
yet a stronger term: it was to be "indissoluble." Arguing a-contrario, it could be said that all that Article 240
EEC intended to convey was that the EEC was not to be
limited in time (unlike the ECSC, for example, which
is so limited); rather, the intention was that it be perpetual. However, it is doubtful how legitimate reliance
on the European Political Community may be, and the
absence of travaux indicate that in interpretation, more
weight should be given to the text and the economie of
the treaty rather than to an attempt to divine the intention of the original framers from extraneous sources.
Regarding textual and contextual argument, the
objective of indicating that the treaty was concluded
for an unlimited period would have been achieved
by silence. Normally, a treaty does not automatically
expire unless a duration is explicitly or implicitly
provided. If then Article 240 EEC is to receive a
40

Power thus conferred could not, therefore, be
withdrawn from the Community, nor could the
objectives with which such powers are concerned
be restored to the field of authority of the member
States alone, except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty.
To admit that the whole of Chapter VI [of the
Euratom Treaty which for our purposes might be
equated with the EEC] lapsed without any new
provisions simultaneously coming into force
would amount to accepting a break in continuity
in a sphere where the Treaty, particularly by
Article 2, has prescribed the pursuit of a common
policy.
The judgment is not conclusive, but it indicates the
preference of the Court for the interpretation restricting rather than enlarging the options for unilateral
Member State action.
As mentioned above, the legal argument, fascinating or otherwise, is of little political relevance. In the
first place, even though at least one Member State,
the United Kingdom, seriously entertained withdrawal plans, and even conducted in 1975 an internal
referendum one choice of which was exit, the passing
years and the ever increasing economic and political
enmeshment of the Member States reduce the feasibility of such an option.
Secondly, for that very same factor of high enmeshment, it would from a practical point of view be highly
unlikely that a Member State could withdraw by a simple deposit of an instrument of withdrawal. The legal
regime of the EEC extends deep into the commercial
and other activities of individuals and undertakings
within the Member States. A non-negotiated withdrawal could create such a level of legal and economic
uncertainty as to be damaging to the withdrawing
State's own interests.
It would be safe, therefore, to make two politicolegal predictions. First, if a Member State were to
decide that withdrawal would be in its best interests,
it is unlikely that other Member States would use legal
means to try to prevent such withdrawal. Such a decision would be greeted with regret or relief, but it

would be accepted. Second, it is unlikely that the
withdrawing Member State would attempt to use such
political license to withdraw abruptly. As the case of
Greenland's withdrawal illustrates, there would probably be protracted negotiations with a view to a mutually satisfactory exit regime.
In conclusion, then, from both the legal and political
points of view in the EEC, the issue of unilateral withdrawal is not critical.
2. Inactive Membership
Let us assume that a Member State of the EEC is
faced with an intra-organizational problem which it is
unable to resolve through the normal decision making
mechanisms. If indeed the political reality of the EEC
is such that unilateral withdrawal is an unlikely option
for solving membership problems, Member States may
resort to other "techniques."

.....
_ _~_ _ _ _
J
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A Member State unhappy with the prospective direction of a Community policy will use
its membership rights to block an unfavorable outcome and will then rely on the failure
of the Community to adopt a policy in order
to take unilateral action.

The first would be the classical "inactive membership." This has happened once in the life of the
Community in the famous, (or, as some would put
it, infamous) crisis of the mid-1960s. In that instance,
France withdrew from active participation in the European institutions, practicing the so-called "empty
chair" policy.
France consciously used inactive membership as a
means of applying pressure on her partners. There was
no question of withdrawal. The technique eventually
succeeded when a solution was found in the legally
dubious Luxembourg Accord of 1966. Under this
treaty, the six partners formally "agreed to disagree,"
but de-facto introduced the right of each Member State
to assert a veto on Community decisions which contradicted a self-defined vital national interest.
From the legal point of view we may confine ourselves to two brief observations. First, during the
period of inactive membership there was no question
that France remained bound by all her treaty obligations in matters concerning the operation of the Common Market. There could be no question of trying to

disengage from the standstill on the introduction of
new customs or quantitative restrictions on imported
goods and the like. Inactive membership simply meant
that France would not participate in the on-going
decision-making activity. Also, strictly speaking, if
Community bodies in the absence of a French representative were to adopt binding measures, these measures would be binding on France. (In principle, this is no
different from other international organizations. As
mentioned above, the membership fees of inactive
members continue to accrue.) Politically this would be
unwise and indeed the other Member States sought a
political resolution to the crisis.
Second, doubts may be expressed about the legality
within the Community context of the very practice of inactive membership.
Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome provides:
Member States shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out
of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by
the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community's
tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives
of this Treaty.
The provision is reminiscent of the duty of "federal
loyalty'' developed in the Federal Republic of Germany.
There can be little question that the French action was
a step which could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the treaty. In principle, France could have
been "sued" by the Commission of the European Community under Article 169 of the treaty or by one or
more other Member States under Article 171 EEC. Once
again, politics and good sense prevailed. Such a legal
action would only have exacerbated the situation and
plunged the Community into an even deeper political
crisis.
3. Overactive Membership
In order to introduce the rather inelegant term
"overactive membership," recourse might be had to
the famous definition of Chutzpah. The epitome of
Chutzpah is illustrated by the case of the child who kills
both his or her parents. When brought to justice, the
youngster throws himself/herself before the Bench and
pleads, "Mercy, I am an orphan."
This "technique" is much closer than the previous
ones to the day-to-day political reality of the Community. By this technique, a Member State unhappy with
the prmpective direction of a Community policy will
use its membership rights to block an unfavorable outcome and will then rely on the failure of the Community to adopt a policy in order to take unilateral action.
I shall illustrate this technique and the legal and
political issues involved therein by reference to one
paradigmatic case study, the case of Commission v.

United Kingdom.
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Article 102 of ~e Act of Accession (regulating all
m~tt~rs concerrung the accession in 1973 to the EEC of
Bntam, Ireland, and Denmark) provides that
[f]rom the sixth year after Accession at the
~atest, the Council [of Ministers of the EEC], actmg on a proposal from the Commission [of the
E~C], s~all determine conditions for fishing
with a view to ensurin~ protection of the fishing
grounds and conservation of the biological
resources of the sea.
This apparently dry and technical provision was of
great political an~ e~onomic moment. In principle, for
!he pury,oses of fis~g, both ~ational fishing grounds,
mcludmg the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, were

The avenues of inactive membership and
overactive membership may yield very
poor results to the
recalcitrant partner.

t~ be_co~si~ered Community fishing grounds with no
discnmmation among fishermen of the various Member States. The introduction of a common conservation
~olicy was a crucial step towards the eventual elaboration of a more general common fisheries policy to be
achieved by the end of 1982.
Until the deadline specified in Article 102 AA,
Member States could impose their own conservation
~easur~s restric~ng_ fishing, subject only to some
mternational obligations and a provisional Community
regime. The Community fear was that Member States
could use this license to impose restrictions which
would indirectly, at least, favor their own fishermen.
Th~ Commission of the European Community duly
made its proposals for common conservation measures
at the beginning of 1979. Council, which is composed
of the governmental representatives of the Member
States, was unable to reach a common accord and
adopted a further series of mterim measures.
The United Kingdom informed the Commission
that, in the light of this failure, and in order to protect
its fishing grounds, it intended to introduce a series
of unilateral conservation measures. These measures
were in most respects very similar to those proposed
by the Commission. The Commission indicated that it
would need time to study these measures. The U.K.
nonetheless brought the measures into force as of
July 1, 1979.
In the language of the judgment:
[t]he criticisms made by the Commission are
based on the consideration that measures of this
42

type cannot be effectively adopted except for the
whole of the Community, that the Council would
~ave been in a position to adopt them in the form
mte?ded by the Treaty if the United Kingdom had
not ztse~f blocked the decision-making process in the
Council a~d that b_y unilaterally adopting the
measures m question the United Kingdom has
encroached upon the powers which belong in
their entirety, as from 1 January 1979, to the
Community [emphasis added].

The recalcitrant
Member State might
be tempted by one
further option: simply
disregard those provisions of Community
law which are not to its
liking while continuing its membership.
This, then, was the situation upon which the
~ourt was called t? adju~icate. The British "orphan,"
m the face of a polio/ which was not to its liking, had
not attempted to withdraw from the Community, nor
even to "sulk" with an empty chair and "inactive membership." Instead, it actively sought to inactivate the
Co~unity ~rocess and thus pave the way for
continued unilateral action.
The European Court of Justice was on the horns of a
real ~emma. Let us review the options:
C?ptwn 1: In the face of the imperative language of
Article 102 of_the Tre~ty of Accession, it could simply
hold that until such time as the Council could reach
agreement on a regime of common conservation measures, no Member State could introduce unilateral
measur~s. The advantage of such a ruling would be
to provide the Member States in the Council with an
incentive to "hurry up" and reach a common accord.
This, h?wever, would be a dangerous path to take.
The notonously tortuous Community decision-making
proce~s ~ou~d mean further lengthy delays. If it were
not Bntam, it could well be some other Member State
which would, at the last minute, introduce objections.
11_1 the 1?eantime, one of two things would take place:
either, m the absence of adequate conservation measures, the fishing grounds would become depleted to
the detriment of all concerned; or, one or more of the
Member States would simply rebel at this last prospect
a1:1d be pushed towards an open defiance of Commumty law. The latter possibility is an extremely rare
occurrence which, indeed, at that time had never
happened.
Op~ion 2: The Court o_f Justice could rule that, given
the failure of the Council to reach agreement and given

further the objective need of introducing conservation
measures, Member States would be allowed to adopt
unilateral provisions.
This would be an equally dangerous path to tread.
Such a ruling would remove any incentive from the
Member States to achieve agreement on common policies since in every field there will always be at least
one partner which would prefer the unilateral way.
"Chutzpah" would be judicially sanctioned.
The Court's eventual judgment was truly
Solomonic.
In the first place it confirmed that
since the expiration ... of the transitional period
laid down by Article 102 [AA], power to adopt,
as part of the common fisheries policy, measures
relating to the conservation of the resources of
the sea has belonged fully and definitively to the
Community.
Then, while taking notice of the failure of the Council of Ministers to act on the proposal of the Commission, the Court further stressed that
the transfer to the Community of powers in this
matter being total and definitive, such a failure to
act could not in any case restore to the Member
States the power and freedom to act unilaterally
in this field.
However, the Court recognized that it would not be
acceptable to make it
entirely impossible for the Member States to
amend existing [national, or interim Community]
conservation measures in case of need owing to
the development of the relevant biological and
technological facts in this sphere.

Generally, in public
international law, the
most effective sanction
is the fear of reciprocal
reprisals.

How then to square the circle? The Court proceeded
to hold that
[b]efore adopting such measures the Member
State concerned is required to seek the approval
of the Commission, which must be consulted at
all stages of the procedure.
This decision achieves the best of all worlds. It
gives a way to ensure that fishing grounds should not
become depleted; it preserves the Community interest
represented by the Commission; and it provides an incentive for the Member States in the Council to adopt a

definitive policy. Under the ruling of the Court, absent
such a Council policy, each Member State would have
to abide by the rulings of the Commission. By contrast,
the Council itself may introduce amendments to the
proposals of the Commission.
This is not the place to analyze expansively and critically the reasoning which allowed the Court to arrive at
this decision. It is sufficient for present purposes to cite
again from the judgment one cornerstone of the
Court's rationale:
According to Article 5 of the Treaty, Member States are required to take all appropriate
measures to facilitate the achievement of the
Community's task and to abstain from any measure which might jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty. This provision imposes
on the Member States special duties of action and
abstention in a situation in which the Commission, in order to meet urgent needs of conservation, has submitted to the Council proposals
which, although they have not been adopted by
the Council, represent the point of departure for
concerted Community action.
As this is a field reserved to the powers of the
Community, within which Member States may
henceforth act only as trustees of the common
interest, a Member State cannot therefore, in the
absence of appropriate action on the part of the
Council, bring into force any interim conservation measures which may be required ... except as
part of a process of collaboration with the
Commission ....
It would seem therefore not only that the EEC Member States are precluded from unilateral withdrawal,
but also that the avenues of inactive membership and
overactive membership may yield very poor results to
the recalcitrant partner. There can be little question
that membership in the EEC is very onerous indeed.

4. Selective Membership
The recalcitrant Member State might be tempted by
one further option: simply disregard those provisions
of Community law which are not to its liking while
continuing its membership. Indeed, this is an option
which is fairly common in current international life; the
notorious weaknesses of international enforcement
mechanisms render this option particularly attractive.
Generally, in public international law, the most effective sanction is the fear of reciprocal reprisals. For
example, a State not according another State the benefits of certain rules of the law of the sea might find
itself denied the same benefits. This type of sanction
is unavailable within the Common Market. A differentiated regime of countervailing measures among the
Member States in the face of alleged or real violations
would have two serious consequences. It would
43
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destroy the basic idea of creating a common market
place of production factors, and it would also penalize
innocent individuals who are among the main beneficiaries of the Common Market. In this respect, a system of reprisals by one or more Member States faced
with another partner's failure to fulfill obligations
would be as unthinkable as it would be for states in the
U.S. to introduce countervailing measures against each
other.
What responses then has the EEC developed to deal
with the recalcitrant Member State practicing "selective
membership"? The EEC has charted a course which
goes well beyond any similar experience in other international organizations and which makes it extremely
difficult for the Member State to adopt the technique of
selective membership. For this the Community relies
on its system of judicial review.

A system of reprisals by one or more Member States faced with another partner's failure
to fulfill obligations would be as unthinkable as it would be for states in the U.S. to
introduce countervailing measures against
each other.

The hierarchy of norms within the EEC is typical of
a non-unitary system. The higher law of the Community is of course the treaty itself. Neither Community
organs nor Member States may violate the treaty in
their legislative and administrative actions. The Community, however, also has extensive legislative capacity
whereby the Council of Ministers, on a proposal by the
commission, may promulgate regulations, directives,
and decisions. These measures, thousands of which
have been promulgated over the last three decades, are
binding in law and are supreme over conflicting Member States' law.
Not surprisingly then, the Community features a
double-limbed system of judicial review which operates on two levels. Two sets of legislative acts and
administrative measures are subject to judicial review:
1.) the measures of the Community itself (acts of the
Council and Commission) which are reviewable for
conformity with the treaties; and, 2.) acts of the Member States which are reviewed for their conformity
with Community law and policy, including the abovementioned secondary legislation.
In the context of our discussion of attempts by
Member States to practice selective membership by
disregarding those obligations which are not to their
liking, the effectiveness of the second set of measures
assumes critical importance. I shall focus here, then,
only on that aspect of judicial review.
Both the Commission of the EEC and individual
Member States may, in accordance with Articles 169-172
44

EEC, bring an action against a Member State for failure
to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. In general,
failure to fulfill an obligation may take the form of
inaction in implementing a Community obligation or
enacting a national measure contrary to Community
obligations. The very existence of a non-optional and
exclusive judicial forum for adjudicating these types of
disputes places the Community above many international organizations. The role of the Commission is
even more special. As noted by one commentator:
[u ]nder traditional international law, the
enforcement of treaty obligations is a matter settled amongst the Contracting Parties themselves.
Article 169, in contrast, enables an independent
community body, the Commission, to invoke the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court
against a defaulting Member State.
At the same time, the "intergovernmental" character
of this procedure and the consequent limitations on its
efficacy are clear enough. Four weaknesses are particularly glaring.
i.) The political nature of the procedure. In the first
place, the decision of the Commission and/or a Member State to bring an action against an alleged violation
by another Member State~will often be influenced by
other (extraneous) political considerations. The Commission might decide that it does not wish to threaten
delicate on-going negotiations and Member States
might not wish to precipitate an international crisis.
Moreover, the Commission, as required by the
infringement procedure, will strive to reach a friendly
settlement with the infringing Member State. This settlement might not fully remedy the infringement
legally. Finally, the Commission might be particularly
reluctant to bring an action against a violation committed by a national judicial decision.
ii.) The problem of monitoring Member State
infringements. Given the vast number of Community
measures, it is simply impossible for the Commission
to keep tabs on all practices of the Member States with
a view to scrutiny and possible judicial action.
iii.) The appropriateness of Article 169 for small
violations. It is unrealistic to expect the Commission
to put the entire legal machinery into full swing in the
face of minor violations. Article 169 would seem more
appropriate for dealing with flagrant violations of some
political consequence.
iv.) The lack of real enforcement. In most cases,
either the prospect or actual commencement of
infringement proceedings is sufficient to terminate a
violation, and even more so, an actual judgment by the
Court condemning the violation. These judgments,
however, are merely declaratory. There is no army to
enforce them nor any real sanction in the event that a
judgment is disregarded. The record of compliance
with decisions of the Court by Member States is
remarkable. But there are several instances when
judgments were disregarded which highlight this
weakness.

These weaknesses are, to an extent, remedied by
judicial review which takes place within the judicial sys-

tem of the Member States in collaboration with the European
Court of Justice. Article 177 EEC provides inter alia that
when a question concerning the interpretation of the
treaty is raised before a national court, the latter mayand if it is a court against whose decision there is no
further judicial remedy then it must-suspend the
national proceedings. It may then make a request for
a preliminary ruling on the correct interpretation of
the treaty to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Once this ruling is made, it is remitted back to
the national court which will give, on the basis of the
ruling, the decision in the case before it. The national
courts and the European Court are integrated thus into
a unitary system of judicial review.
The European Court and national courts have made
good use of this procedure. On its face, the purpose of
Article 177 is simply to ensure uniform interpretation
of Community law throughout the Member States.
However, very often the factual situation in which Article 177 comes into play is when an individual litigant
pleads in the national court that a rule or measure or
national practice should not be applied because it violates the Community obligations of the Member State.
The attempts of Member States to practice selective
membership by disregarding their obligations thus
come regularly to be adjudicated before their own
national courts. On remission to the European Court,
the latter renders its interpretation of Community law

A Member State should not be allowed to
practice the alternative techniques for avoiding obligations. If a Member State cannot
accept these obligations, it is better that it
be allowed to withdraw, even unilaterally.
within the factual context of the case before it. Theoretically a division exists whereby the European Court
may not itself rule on the application of Community law.
But as one scholar (Rasmussen) notes:
It is no secret, however, that in practice, when
making preliminary rulings the Court has often
transgressed the theoretical borderline .. .it provides the national judge with an answer in which
questions of law and of fact are sufficiently interwoven as to leave the national judge with only
little discretion and flexibility in making his final
decision.

What is important, indeed crucial, in the procedure,
is the fact that it is the national court which renders the final
judgment. The main result of this procedure is the binding effect and enforcement value which such a decision
has on a Member State-coming from its own courts
-as opposed to a similar decision handed down in
declaratory fashion by the European Court under the
previously discussed 169 procedure.
This takes care of the most dramatic weakness
of that procedure, the ability of a Member State, in
extremis, to disregard the strictures of the European
Court. Under the 177 procedure this is not possible. A
Member State-in our Western democracies-cannot
disobey its own courts.
The other weaknesses of the 169 procedure are also
remedied to some extent: individual litigants are-usually not politically motivated in bringing their actions;
small as well as big violations come to be adjudicated;
and in terms of monitoring, the Community citizen
becomes merely a decentralized agent for monitoring compliance by Member States with their treaty
obligations.
Conclusions
This analysis of the European Community system
has shown that the reluctant Member State wishing to
practice any of the three avoidance techniques-inactive membership, overactive membership and selective
membership, as an alternative to withdrawal, faces in
the Community serious legal and political constraints
for such behavior.
We may now return to our point of departurethe legality of unilateral withdrawal-and re-examine
it as a matter of policy rather than in strict legal terms.
Underlying the classical analysis was the notion of the
universal international organization. In such organizations the very fact of large and pluralistic membership
has a high value in itself. The truncated and diminishing membership of the League of Nations remains a
valid experience till this day. Even if States disregard
some of their membership obligations, it is probably
still worthwhile for the international community as a
whole to retain as wide a membership as possible in
the universal organization.
This is not the case in an organization such as the
EEC. The EEC could not function, and its very basic
objectives would be irreparably compromised, if
Member States could retain their membership and
yet systematically avoid their many and day-to-day
obligations. In these circumstances, we come to a conclusion which overturns accepted wisdom of international law. The conclusion must be that a Member State
should not be allowed to practice the alternative techniques for avoiding obligations. If a Member State cannot accept these obligations, it is better that it be
allowed to withdraw, even unilaterally.

A profile of Professor Weiler appears on pages 7-8.

